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VALUING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RUSSELL HARDIN*

Patrick Croskery and Lawrence Becker approach the problem of
protecting intellectual property with virtually opposite opening moves.'
Becker looks at the individual inventor or creator of intellectual property
and then evaluates arguments for justifying its ownership by the creator
as a matter of personal desert. Croskery starts at the systemic level and
questions what institution of intellectual property protection would generally work best in some utilitarian sense. Neither Becker nor Croskery
attempts to elucidate a model regime of intellectual property protection.
I generally share Croskery's vision of how to analyze major issues, especially issues in law. One of the institutional devices Croskery discusses,
however, implicitly depends on an analog of Becker's move in its assignment of value to intellectual property. When values are assigned from
the ground up, the resulting incoherence undercuts some systemic ways
of thinking through the problem and vitiates a principle of desert for the
intellectual property one has, in part and only in part, created.
Croskery argues, in essence, that government has more apt incentive
structures for some things, the market for others.2 Government may be
especially good for collective consumption goods, the market especially
good for private consumption goods. Intellectual property has a mixture of the strategic characteristics of private consumption goods and
collective consumption goods. 3 Becker notes that enforcing rights to intellectual property is essentially an effort to mimic scarcity where there is
none.4 We may therefore suppose that some mixture of government and
market sanctions might be the best device for enhancing private incentives to produce such goods and to put them to use. These views are
compelling and it seems implausible, though perhaps not impossible, that
anyone could disagree with them after careful consideration. The question that naturally arises, however, is the one that Croskery addresses for
much of his paper: how to figure out and manage this complex mix of
* Professor and Chair, Department of Politics, New York University, Ph.D., M.I.T., 1971.
1. Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 609
(1992); Patrick T. Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianismand IntellectualProperty, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 631 (1992).
2. Croskery, supra note 1, at 633.
3. Id.
4. Becker, supra note 1, at 616.
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incentives to achieve both high levels of invention and high levels of application of inventions. Superficially, at least, these seem like incompatible goals, because higher returns to inventors increase the incentive to
invent but raise prices of products using their inventions and thereby imply lower levels of application. How do we balance the two considerations? This question and its analogs in other areas of the law are at the
core of law and economics.
POLANY'S AGENCY
Croskery canvasses a proposal of Michael Polanyi for patent reform
that might solve the problem of creating optimal incentives to invent and
apply new devices and ideas. 5 That proposal, however, has a central conceptual flaw that suggests that any simple view of influencing individual
incentives may be misguided. The flaw is that measuring the value of a
particular invention to a firm is typically impossible. This is not merely
the result of strategic and other empirical difficulties, such as those Croskery discusses. 6 It is a flaw in principle, it is a conceptual flaw, not
merely a measurement problem. When there is multiple or complex causation, there may be no compelling way to parcel out the contributions of
the many causes to the final result. This is generally true for varied
problems in many disciplines and not only in economics. From Smith
through most of the nineteenth century, much of economics foundered
on failed efforts to parcel the contributions of capital and labor to the
joint products of the two.
To see how the problem of parceling contributions afflicts the world
of patents, let Croskery explain Polanyi's device for encouraging a high
level of invention and, simultaneously, a high level of access to
inventions:
In Polanyi's system people invent things as they currently do, and register their inventions in a manner similar to the present patent system.
They do not, however, then possess the right to exclude others from
the use of the invention. It is applied wherever it is useful, by whoever
desires to use it. Users are required to license the invention, but there
is no payment required for this license. All that is required of licensees
is that they provide the patentee with information on the value of the
invention. This information has to be in a form that will permit the
own assessment of the economic value created
patentee to make "their
'7
by the invention."
The central problem of this program is: "How are accountants sup5. Michael Polanyi, PatentReform, 9 REv. EcON. STUD. 61 (1944).
6. Croskery, supra note 1, at 639-41.
7. Id. at 638 (quoting Polanyi, supra note 5, at 61, 67).
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posed to be able to certify to what extent the profits of a company producing a new product are the result of the invention as against effective
marketing, or organization, or efficiencies of production?" 8 All of these
factors contribute to the company's profits-along with capital in land,
buildings, equipment, and money (including loans), labor, and inputs of
goods and commodities. Polanyi supposes that even his institutional system for regulating patents will contribute some of the value of inventions
by causing them to be more widely adopted. 9 One might push this point
further, as Hobbes does, and note that virtually all the value of production in a modem society is due sine qua non to the existence of a state
that brings enough order to allow us to escape the primitive and unproductive conditions of the state of anarchy.
Firms may constantly try to reduce costs of some of their factors of
production. But it seems unlikely that firms put great effort into calculating the share of profits contributed by all these as the relationships
change. In any case, they have no competent theory for allocating the
profits across the costs. This is not crippling, however, because they can
use trial and error (and the example of others). They do not first have to
find a theory that parcels causal effects in order to discover better production policy. And, most importantly, they can focus on the aggregate
profit without parceling it among all the contributing causes.
Polanyi's accountants cannot work that way. The firm can look at
total returns in the market and then tinker with costs to raise the returns.
The government must discover what the actual causal relations are-it
must finally parcel the causal contributions of various inputs in order to
determine the share of profit that is owed to the use of some patent.
There is no independent measure of "better" for what these government
accountants want and need because government requires a kind of information different from what the firm requires. Sadly, the causal relations
do not take the right form for the government's purpose. They are complex and largely inseparable, not individual and parcelable.
COMPLEX CAUSATION

The problem of complex causation is not unique to economics. Indeed, that problem is one of the reasons philosophers such as Bertrand
Russell have declared cause a useless and even senseless term-and they
8. Id at 639.
9. Polanyi, supra note 5, at 68. Hence, only part of the value attributable to a patent would be
owed to the inventor.
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mean to sweep the boards from physics to economics to daily affairs. 10
Complex causation is fundamentally important in all of the sciences,
although it has been more troublesome for scientific progress in some
areas than in others. For example, it has so far been devastating for the
attempt to give a theoretically coherent account of weather. But it
hardly mattered for physics through the early part of this century and,
even today, for many problems in physics. Why? Some physical relations could genuinely be separated from other considerations. They were
sufficiently decoupled from much else that they could be relatively directly observed and measured. For example, the resultant of various
forces on a particle can be represented as a vector sum, with, say, magnetic and gravitational forces on droplets of oil carrying free electrons
measured separately and then summed. The simple, linear properties of
these relationships make them tractable. Imagine trying to find the vector sum of forces that pushed George Bush out of the presidency. If the
value of a firm's product were, like the speed of falling oil drops in the
Millikan experiment, just the vector sum of easily measured contributions from various inputs, we might soon handle Polanyi's task.
In various forms, the problem of assigning causal shares of an output or outcome back to its inputs is central to all of the social sciences,
and to law,"' ethics, 12 medicine, and physics-not to speak of commonsense daily relations, as in families and social groups. Arthur Fine, a
philosopher of science, quips that this general problem will be solved
soon because physicists with their vast resources can make little further
progress without solving it. 13 Perhaps, however, it is theoretically insoluble and not even physicists can solve it. What they must do is reconceive
their problems. In any case, the critical concern for lawyers who are
interested in the legal regime for patents is not to solve this general problem but only to handle it as well as economists do. The extraordinary
fact is that economists "solved" their problem of how to attribute to each
input in production its value or causal role in the final product. Econo10. For a recent contribution, see Alex Rosenberg, Causation, Probability, and the Monarchy,
29 AM. PHIL. Q. 305 (1992). Rosenberg's title comes from Russell's claim that the "law of causality
is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do
no harm." Id. at 305 (quoting BERTRAND RUSSELL, MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 174 (1957)). Rosenberg's concern is with a particular form of complexity: probabilistic relations between antecedent
events and the events which these supposedly cause, as in quantum mechanics. But probabilism (of a
perhaps cruder kind) pervades social and economic relations as well.
11. There is a live debate in law, as represented most authoritatively by H.L.A. HART & TONY
HONOR., CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
12. Russell Hardin, Ethics and Stochastic Processes, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 69 (1989).
13. Oral remarks in a seminar at the Medical School of the University of Chicago.
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mists solved the problem finally by ignoring it, reconceiving their central
problem, and inventing price theory to handle it.
From Adam Smith through Karl Marx, it was often supposed that
we could assign the value of production linearly to labor and capital.
Karl Pribram exaggerates only somewhat when he says, "As seen by
Smith, the main problem of distribution consisted in explaining the contributions made by the productive factors (labor, land, and capital) to the
value of the product."' 4 Smith was also a strong proponent of nascent
price theory grounded in relations of supply and demand. He was therefore transitional between an older vision and the modem vision; he saw
the need for a price theory independent of value, but he was either not
willing or not clear enough to jettison value. Marx, who lived considerably later, returned fundamentally to value, declaring the value of a good
to be a function of the labor value that went into producing it. In that
move, he attempted to be transitional between the modem vision and the
retrograde older vision.' 5 That is a sad role for a revolutionary thinker.
He started intellectual life as a Hegelian philosopher and he took up economic reasoning with severe theoretical prejudices in his way.
Unfortunately, the simple additive view of contributions to value
was often compounded by the simultaneous, but unrelated, view that the
objects produced had a value, as in Marx's labor theory of the value of
objects.' 6 No major western economist today would countenance the
view that objects have value per se. They have value only subjectively,
that is, only to the extent that people value them. If the love of diamonds
went into steep decline tomorrow, diamonds would lose much of their
apparent value-and that would be independent of the costs of inputs in
their production. Pearls lost their value over the course of this century,' 7
tulip bulbs once had astonishingly high prices, land prices are conspicuously driven by supply and demand,"' and high-tech computers have
prices that fall steadily and amazingly fast.' 9 When academics talk about
14. KARL PRIBRAM, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC REASONING 129 (1983).
15. For contrary views on the possibility and coherence of a labor theory of value, see John E.
Roe, R.P. Wolff's Reinterpretationof Marx's Labor Theory of Value: Comment, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF.70 (1983).
16. Smith's understanding of supply-and-demand prices escapes this falling.
17. In 1917, Pierre Cartier owned a string of pearls on offer for $1.5 million. Daisy Plant and
her husband traded their mansion on Fifth Avenue for the string. If that mansion, now the Cartier
store, were sold today, it would bring many millions of dollars. In 1957, Daisy Plant's pearls sold at
auction for $151,000. Anne-Marie Schiro, The Return ofPear. A Guidefor Buyers, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1981, § 2, at 52.
18. Parents and in-laws may nevertheless incoherently admonish their young that the exorbitant prices the young pay for housing are far beyond the values of the housing.
19. Readers of early personal computing magazines may recall letters from computer owners
who complained about the nearly instant obsolescence and loss in price of their machines, as though
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buying the latest computer, someone often suggests waiting for the next
round of innovations. The standard quip in response is that the best of
all policies to maximize value received for the money would be to wait
until the year before you retire and buy the latest technology then rather
than get cheated by current prices for clunky technology.
An obvious implication of this subjective view of value is that it
must be highly contingent. The value I place on something will depend
on what other things I have available. This means that the values of
various things to me are not derived from their individual values. Indeed, it is even hard to imagine what the individual value of a particular
consumption could mean in any absolute sense. We can speak finally
only of marginal values that depend on the contingent facts of what else
is already in place or potentially so. The apparently simple change from
objective to subjective notions of value implicitly entailed vast changes in
the way we conceive value at all and in the way value enters economic
20
theory and explanation.
What's an economist to do? Mainly, forget about value and work
with price. The remarkable fact is that this is a sensible resolution of the
problem of assigning partial causal values to the inputs to a product.
Economics has little role for the latter. For example, partial causal values say nothing about clearing markets or about the succession of technologies-although, oddly, it was the succession of technologies that
drove much of Marx's theorizing. Such values may have meaning in
piecework or in picking berries and other crops, for which output and
input can be very closely related with only minor intrusions of complex
additional factors. 21 But it was a figment and a prejudice in many contexts. Polanyi's device would resurrect that prejudice, which is a prejudice of poor theory.
Suppose we follow the lead of economists and drop the concern with
value and look instead to prices. Can Polanyi's device be made to work
for prices instead of for causal contributions to value? There is a large
such firms as Apple and IBM had done them harm. They resented that other people bought better
machines for less by waiting a year or even less, and they often suggested that these firms owed them
special breaks in return for their having pioneered the use of then-expensive computers. The computer on which I type this paper cost less in real terms than the first one I bought almost a decade
ago, but it is orders of magnitude more powerful and flexible. The one I once loved for its wondrous
power now sits in some isolated corner of the University of Chicago where it still works as well as it
ever did, but where it may be daily cursed for its incapacity, as I would curse it if I had to use it now.
Value is in the eye of the beholder.
20. See, RUSSELL HARDIN, MOIRLrrY WITHIN THE LiMrrs OF REAON 169-78 (1988).

21. Even for piecework and picking crops, however, the price of the product is a social construct of other relations of supply and demand, so that we still cannot transcend discussion of price
to get some notion of value.
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literature on pricing of services and goods, such as collective goods,
which do not have market prices, and for those whose prices may be
thought improperly affected by non-market forces, as in arguments for
comparable worth. Unfortunately, these approaches will probably not
work well for intellectual property, and for reasons that Polanyi would
well have understood. No one looking at Bill Gates's nascent software
empire around 1980 could have been expected to estimate the prices he
could get for his firm's products and the price of the stock that he owned
or would come to own. The Austrian school of economics typically may
have glorified the workings of the price system, but their general point
seems compelling. Prices encapsulate vastly more information than people typically have available for making their choices-that is, if the prices
are not managed by a central authority that puts into them less information than a market would.
The role of Polanyi's patent agency would be to set or infer prices.
But the problem for Polanyi is even more fundamental than merely the
lack of information to do this well. Firms also face lack of information.
Polanyi's agency could not do what a firm does, it could not look at
aggregate profit and tinker with inputs to try to increase the profit. It
would still have to try to price pieces of what is going on, namely the
pieces involving the input of inventions. It would not have available the
simpler device of looking to aggregate profits because aggregate profits
are not related in any simple way to the input of inventions and because
the agency's pricing of these inputs would affect overall production and
therefore profits in no simple way. Hence, the solution that works for the
firm would not work for Polanyi's government agency, which finally
must weigh like a dead hand on intellectual property. The Civil Aeronautics Board and other price-setting regulatory agencies may have become objectionable primarily because they enabled or forced their
industries to be wasteful, as critics asserted. Polanyi's agency might
force industries to forgo opportunities and therefore to be productively
inefficient. It might look more like IBM than like the contemporary
software industry.
THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

If we cannot start with valuations made from the ground up, what
must we finally do to improve the economic returns from intellectual
property? In general, we must attempt to judge whether the current patent system has perverse effects that we might address and whether it
seems to produce a high level of both invention and the use of inventions.
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Although specific cases could and typically should be analyzed to make
systemic arguments, the focus of the inquiry must be systemic. If there
seem to be problems that plausibly can be fixed, the law could be changed
and the new law adopted long enough to see its effects. Such experimentation happens naturally in most governments to a limited extent, because legislatures, agencies, and courts are incapable of fully binding
relevant future practices.
To attempt, as Polanyi proposed, to go after the actual reward for
patents, by having government collect "relevant" fees and make payments to patent holders, might actually work to enhance the level of invention and application of new technologies. But that cannot be shown
theoretically, and many other possible devices, such as shorter or longer
periods for patents or tax incentives for research or reduced regulatory
constraints on the introduction of new technologies, might work far better than Polanyi's device. In particular, one might expect that Polanyi's
device must tend toward bureaucratism that would be stifling in the long
run.
Thomas Jefferson's view that the tree of liberty needs to be fed with
blood roughly once a generation might be wrong, as Thomas Hobbes
would insist. 22 But big, bureaucratized organizations of lesser scope
should perhaps be jolted fairly frequently, perhaps every generation or
even more often. Unfortunately, political debate often focuses on the
supposedly intrinsic wrongness of some form of government oversight
that has deteriorated into bureaucratism. The view that such deterioration is a natural tendency need not, however, recommend against creating new government agencies to handle particular problems. It merely
recommends keeping an eye on such agencies and having the resolve to
pull their plugs when they become comatose. It would not be incoherent
to argue that it was right to create many regulatory agencies that it was
later also right to shut down. 23 The patent law is like regulatory agencies
in this respect, and it would be even more obviously so if it were managed by Polanyi's odd agency, whose life might best be short.
There are times when problems of complex causation might not
22. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 13-15 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1954) (1651); Russell Hardin,
Hobbesian Political Order, 19 POL. THEORY 156 (1991).
23. James Madison supposed that we should continue with a law until it is overturned by a
later majority. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), reprinted in I THE
FOUNDERS' CONSrrrTiON 70-71 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Thomas Jefferson thought age limits would be better for debts and for some laws in order to let the next generation
be bound only if it actively chose to be. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6,
1789), reprinted in I THE
eds., 1987).

FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION

68-70 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
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seem to be critical to an economic analysis of law. For example, our
interaction, tortious or contractual, might be largely uncoupled from
other interactions, and we might therefore think it could be analyzed on
its own merits. But that conclusion is typically wrong. What we require
in the law is a general principle for handling certain kinds of interaction.
That principle is justifiable at the institutional level, not at the individualcase level. 24 True, the principle should be influenced by the nature of the
cases it will have to address. But it should also be influenced by the
effects it will have on related principles and on incentives that may actually change the incidence of the problems it is to govern. In general we
cannot coherently conceive of law as about cases removed from the
larger context. The dramatic failure of campaign finance reforms under
the Federal Election Commission is arguably the result of focusing on the
nature of individual cases and ignoring the larger context. Changes that
controlled certain individual practices set up massive institutional
changes that have been exploited by people who ostensibly abide fully by
the law while raising and spending more money than ever.
DESERT

Becker canvasses three arguments from desert. Two of these are
that the public bestows property rights on people in response to their
excellence or their needs. These two are not compelling for typical contemporary inventors of intellectual property. Nobel and other prizes
may be a more fitting response to excellence. And although there may be
cases that fit Becker's special notion of need, they cannot be central to
intellectual property law. Becker's third argument from desert is that
bestowing rights in intellectual property is a justifiable reciprocal exchange of value for value. 25 In this argument, desert raises the problems
of value and complex causation. If I deserve something in return "for
value produced" 26 with my invention, what do I deserve? As in the discussion of complex causation above, there is no natural measure of the
value I have created-perhaps only once Dupont or Apple takes over the
manufacture of products that use my invention does much value get created. Hence, we are back to the problem of assessing the causal contribution of my effort to any subsequent value.
Some intellectual property, unlike tangible property, can be sold to
24. Russell Hardin, The Morality ofLaw and Economics, I1LAW & PHIL. 331, 349-58 (1992);
Russell Hardin, BlackmailingforMutual Good, 141 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) [hereinafter
Hardin, Blackmailing].
25. Hardin, Blackmailing, supra note 24 (manuscript at 25-30, on file with author).
26. Becker, supra note 1, at 624.
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me and then to you and then to millions. I might even prefer that millions have some intellectual creation in the sense that I would pay more
for it if enough others have it. Is the more I would pay owed to the
inventor or to millions of other users? The latter sounds silly-we owe
each other? And the former seems wrong. Two people might have created competing system software when only one system would be adopted

by the principle manufacturer of personal computers. IBM might have

chosen between the two by flipping a coin. The system owned by Bill
Gates then went on to ground the company that has brought him wealth
in the billions of dollars. The one owned by Joe Unlucky went on to
oblivion and poor Joe works as a developer in one small software firm
after the other. Why is Gates now a multi-billionaire? The answer, happily, is complex. IBM coordinated software producers on a single operating system, letting them develop programs that large numbers of
people could use with their identical systems. In the first instance,
Gates's operating system need merely have been the one chosen. Thereafter it had the special advantage that millions were best served by continuing to coordinate on its operating system. If we could parcel causal
contributions, that coin toss would seem to be owed more than Gates,
more than the intellectual property at issue.
Suppose we wish to argue that Gates and Unlucky deserved something for their patents and the returns from those patents, which is to say
from their intellectual property somehow restricted. There are two ways
we might go. First, we could say they deserve what the market brings
them. This is tantamount to saying desert is an otiose and pointless principle-so let the market rip. A desert theory that merely says people
deserve what they get is of no interest because, for example, it gives no
instruction for the law. Alternatively, we will have to intervene in what
the market has done to make the deserts right, for example, by awarding
Unlucky some of the wealth Gates has amassed. But this device is incoherent if it is argued from the values created, just as the effort to parcel
out causal contributions to products is incoherent. If we cannot sensibly
parcel the causal contributions of Gates to the state of affairs as it actually exists, we are helpless before the demand to parcel the contribution
Unlucky might have made in some other history of events.
Perhaps there is some third form of argument from desert. If that
form produces results radically different from those of the market, its
conflict with commitment to productivity in relatively untrammeled mar-
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ket relations will be problematic. 27 The market resolves the problem of
complex causation of value by largely ignoring it and relying on demand
and supply relations. An argument from desert seems to require a more
direct resolution of that problem. My inclination is to conclude that desert is an incoherent principle. The term desert may be used as a synonym of fairness (I deserve my share) or other principles rather than as a
causal welfarist principle. Then the desert that is at issue stands or falls
with the fairness or other concern that backs it. When it is a causal
welfarist principle, however, there appears to be no way to save it from
incoherence.
In any case, we are in an odd position if we invoke desert for allocating rewards from intellectual property. Virtually everything else-your
labor and mine, the manufacture of silicon chips-is rewarded according
to supply and demand prices. It would be perverse then to reward certain intellectual contributions according to their "value." As discussed
above, we might set Polanyi's agency to work setting prices instead of
computing values. It would do a poor job. But we should break the hold
of the supposition that we are rewarding value with value. We are simply paying prices. It is incoherent to say we reward price with price.
There is nothing intrinsically right in rewarding intellectual work with
price. Price is only a device for clearing markets. Paying the price for
intellectual products is the right thing to do only by reason of its consequences for productive efficiency. But if that is our reason for creating
artificial prices, we should consider whether there are better means to
28
this end.
It is sometimes argued that utilitarianism fails and should be rejected because it demands calculation that we cannot perform. Unfortunately, that is a potentially devastating criterion that, if seriously
invoked, would bring down the whole of moral theory. Desert theory,
for example, as it might be applied to intellectual property rights, seems
to demand calculation that we not only cannot do but that cannot be
done in principle. It is therefore not merely difficult, it is incoherent.
Perhaps the whole of moral theory should be brought down. And then
what of ordinary rational choice? That too demands calculation beyond
our capacity. Shall we bring it down too? Perhaps there are other things
we could wreck as well while we have our sledge hammers out. Or perhaps we should be sensible enough to concede that sometimes we cannot
27. We might argue for intervention in order to enhance productivity and consumption, as
Croskery does for collective consumption goods.

28. We might also wish to regulate prices for reasons of fairness, as in the concern with comparable worth.
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master our world as well as we would like. Then we could, carefully,
bring down bits of theory that demand incoherence.
CONTEMPORARY SOFrWARE ISSUES

Enforcement of some intellectual property rights goes little beyond
the printed statement on the seal of a typical package of software: "By
opening this envelope you signify your acceptance of X company's icense agreement.... If you do not agree with these terms, do not open
this sealed package, and promptly return the entire package to the place
you obtained it for a full refund." In one important sense, this label is
odd. We do not generally post signs not to steal. Imagine signs at the
entrances of stores saying "By entering this store you signify your willingness to pay for what you take. If you do not accept these terms,
please leave the store immediately." Perhaps we are coming close to that
in New York and other cities where people commonly do post signs to
say that there is nothing in their Mercedes worth stealing, signs evidently
intended to keep thieves from entering.
Consider three kinds of software property rights infringement. Use
of programs without paying for them by individual users; use of more
copies of a program than is covered by corporate network pricing; and
use of code from a program by another software maker.
Most of the computer users I have asked say they have bought far
more programs than they actually use and that they do not currently use
any program they did not pay for, although they have tried programs,
and maybe even used them for a while, that they did not buy. The explanations for not stealing software are largely about the inconvenience of
doing so, not about the morality of it.29 That suggests that, as software
prices rise, inconvenience might be trumped. Software makers have
largely given up the schemes of software protection that once encumbered many programs, perhaps because they believed such protection lost
them more sales than it gained them. (They could look to the evidence of
sales of competing, unprotected products.) By the usual devices of marketing trial and error, firms have concluded that software protection generally makes sense only for computer games and for some very expensive,
specialized programs. Oddly, their inability to block copying of their
programs has given them incentive to make regular improvements and
29. 1 asked questions in a simplistic, non-directive way to avoid inducing people to seem to
have moral concerns. Since they all know me as a moral philosopher, they might have been expected
to bring up moral concerns if they had any. Perhaps the world of software seems too crass for
morality.
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corrections that they might otherwise not bother to make until a superior
product threatens their market for new sales.30 Hence they have found a
way to encourage users to buy their programs. As Croskery notes, private provision may be more efficient than government provision even for
31
coming up with a system of intellectual property protection.
The greater problem that bothers software vendors may be the systematic violation by corporate users of the makers' contract impositions
by letting more individuals use a program than the purchased network
agreement allows. This problem is somewhat similar to various devices
for price discrimination in other contexts. For example, the airlines notoriously sell tickets for identical itineraries and in-flight service for radically varied prices. They create rules to try to maximize their take rather
than simply offering flights for a fixed rate. The airlines have at times had
devices that people could use to break through the price discrimination.
For example, one might use the so-called star code for a special convention rate even though one is not going to the convention. 32 And one
could book two separate trips so as to split them across two tickets, each
with a cheap weekend rate even though the actual trips were day-return.
(The person who has not done that has probably not flown very much.)
The airlines have been hesitant to try to protect their pricing by making
it a crime to do such things as piggyback on a convention rate, perhaps
because they reckon that good will is worth more to them than what they
might gain from criminalizing such behavior.33 That is to say, for market reasons, they have adopted an analog of software companies' policy
of not protecting their programs against unauthorized users.
If we were passing a law on price discrimination, it is not clear that,
except for the persuasive power of their campaign contributions, we
would decide to enforce the airlines' pricing. It is not prima facie evident
that willingness to pay should affect price levels for airfares but not for
milk or automobiles. A corporation that has already paid more than
individuals for its software programs might similarly claim that just as it
uses screwdrivers, bought at market price, far more than most homeowners ever do without paying a premium for that heavy use, it should not
have to pay a premium for software. But if we push the matter down to
this level of the direct morality of pricing regimes, we lose touch with the
30. In the meantime, some companies may have decided there is greater profit to be made
selling upgrades than selling new product.
31. Croskery, supra note 1, at 656.
32. Wade Lambert & Amy D. Marcus, American Sues Publisher That Pinted Codes for Convention Discounts, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1991, at B6.
33. American Airlines did go after the publisher of a newsletter that published the star codes.
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larger issue of what system would be generally most productive. We
could settle the issue down at this level and then deplore the overall result we produced.
Finally, the major question that drives various suits in the software
industry is whether a firm can use a modified version of another firm's
code in a program without paying you a license fee. Trying to analyze
this at the level of the specific issue by imputing the value of the borrowing shows no promise of a compelling resolution. For reasons argued
here-for example, in considering Polanyi's regulatory regime-we can
confidently say the issue is incoherent at that level. We will not ascertain
the value of Apple's borrowings from Xerox or of Microsoft's borrowings
from Apple. Courts may assign them values, but those values will be
figments of the judges' imaginations.
Arbitrary rules are an honorable and necessary part of the law.
Consider a seemingly simple rule that might be adopted either through
legislation or court decision. If company A's program has 10,000 lines of
code, of which 1,000 appear in a prior product of company B, then A
must pay ten percent of its profit from the program to B. 34 There is a
peculiar problem of intellectual property that calls even this rule into
question. An intellectual product is likely to be of much value to its
creator only if its existence is made known. But, in the world of technology, knowing that something can be done is often sufficient incentive and
lead to get others to do it. The knowledge that must be protected if my
clever program is not to mimicked by others is the knowledge that such a
program is currently possible. Because spreading that knowledge is in
my interest, it is odd to suppose I would want to block its spread. After
the invention and use of the atomic bomb, some people thought the
knowledge how to make the bomb would remain an American monopoly, only somewhat shared with the English. Many of those people instinctively supposed someone must have committed treason if the
Russians could so quickly build their own bomb. Many physicists supposed, on the contrary, that, by exploding Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the
Americans guaranteed that they would not long have a monopoly.
Surely the physicists were right and their counterparts today are running
the software revolution.
Scholars of law and economics who focus on overall efficiency
should look not to causal contribution of some lines of code to a com34. Even the definition of profit for a particular product is arbitrary to a large extent in a
complex firm with many products and overhead functions whose costs cannot be causally allocated
across product lines. Accounting principles, which are conventional and often arbitrary, get their
value from being definitive rather than from being somehow theoretically right.
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pany's profits but rather to what general rules might provoke the most
competition in creativity and implementation. As a Hayekist would argue, that requires empirical trial and error. Firms may be better at empirical testing than government is, not least just because there are so
many firms. However, government has no choice but to have some regime of intellectual property protection, and it should therefore look to
experience in revising the regime.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Arguments derived strictly from the nature of intellectual property
will not get us very far. We will need to bring in empirical, contingent
considerations that matter enormously. For example, Becker says that
defenses of some rights to tangible property that are grounded in desert
carry over readily to intellectual property. 35 Croskery notes that there
are contingent strategic considerations that make it different in a causal
sense, 36 so different that one cannot assume that the similarities in a desert-theory account matter. For example, it seems plausible that the enforcement of property rights over physical assets is cheaper and easier
than is enforcement of property rights over intellectual property. In a
utilitarian theory, of course, this means there are moral differences.
The institutional view of how to handle intellectual property rights
bulldozes individual-level concern with desert except insofar as concern
with desert influences incentives to invent and to use inventions. Perhaps
every serious student of the law is an institutionalist at least in large part.
For example, Becker refers to the need to consider "aggregate welfare"
as well as considerations of desert 37 and he is very much an institutionalist in most of his work on law. Hart and Honor6, in their survey of
causation in the law find that resolutions of the problem of complex causation or responsibility in the law are more nearly determined by consid38
erations of workability than by considerations of causal responsibility.
Workability is a close cousin of efficiency. It would be odd'if efficiency
should guide the criminal law but not the law of intellectual property
rights. Incidentally, differences in tangible and some intellectual property imply great differences in the workability of property rights regimes
for them. Unfortunately, our theory is woefully inadequate even to the
systemic task, because government does not have the short cut of focusing on aggregate profits that is available to firms.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Becker, supra note 1, at 610.
Croskery, supra note 1,at 633 (table of goods and accompanying text).
Becker, supra note 1, at 628.
See HART & HONOat, supra note 11.
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Finally, note the conclusion of Ronald Coase, labeled the Coase theorem, that the assignment of rights to use some property does not affect
aggregate production. 39 If this held in the world of intellectual property,
we would seemingly be much less bothered to find the right or a better
regime of intellectual property rights, since we would then already have
productive efficiency. The assumption of most of the literature on intellectual property rights is that the Coase theorem does not apply. There
are at least two problems with applying the theorem. First, the intellectual property right holder must negotiate with vast numbers of actual
and potential customers to achieve maximum returns, so that the normally dyadic conditions of the Coase theorem are swamped. Second, the
interest in intellectual property is not merely how to allocate returns but
also to affect its creation. This dynamic often drives Hayek's claims for
the superiority of market over government setting of production levels
and of prices. 4 ° And it is surely the reason, in this period of astonishing
innovation, that we are concerned with assigning rights to intellectual
property. Indeed, the rates of innovation and of the application of innovations seem too extraordinary for us readily to believe that the system
needs a drastic fix. Anyone who thinks it does faces the burden of showing why.

39. RONALD H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE
LAW 95 (1988).
40. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONsTrruTIoN OF LIBERTY 39-53 (1960).

